Platonic Philosophy as Expressed as a Set of Propositions

By Pierre Grimes, Ph.D.

I offer this for a bit of philosophical fun. As you may know Phil Simpson is taking some classes at CSULB and he shared with me logical positivists’ analysis of Plato.

It was set out as a logical set of propositions and I laughed once again at how foolish it was to try to understand Plato, or anything else, based upon sources that were at best shallow and at worst simply wrong.

I made my usual remarks about this style of thinking. Later we exchanged some emails and in one I said, “these logical positivists have been nursed on a watered down brew of Plato. It has been poured down their throats by their own gentleman's agreement not to look into the mysticism of Plato.

When they do read Plato they believe they are finding fault with his thought but their arguments are as shallow as their mythical view of Plato. They fail to grasp what anyone who knows Plato knows and that is simply that an idea is no more a concept than a positivist is a philosopher.

So, as it is often said “you can led a logical positivist to Plato but you can't make him think." Rather than leave it at that I thought it would be fun to use their logical style of thinking and knock out a Platonist’s view of the same issues.

So, here it is and below is also the material Phil had sent me. I should, of course, mention that the reference to “Y” in these statements could easily be understood as standing for Being, Beauty, Reality, and others such Ideas.


Phil’s presentation of Logical Positivist set of propositions:

(1a) the expression Y is the name of something, an Idea (or Form, or Essence).

(1b) In each context where the expression Y occurs, it is the name of the same thing, the same Idea.

(2a) It is by participation in the Idea of Y-ness that a thing is Y.


(2b) There is something, an Idea, such that it is by participation therein that a thing is Y.


(2c) A thing is Y if and only if it participates in the Idea of Y-ness.


(3a) There is exactly one Idea such that it is by participation therein that a thing is Y.


(3b) There are never two distinct Ideas such that a thing is Y by participation in the one as well as by participation in the other.

(1) Ethical and esthetical Ideas, such as the Idea of the Good, the Idea of the Just, the Idea of the Beautiful.

(2) There is an Idea such that a thing is Y if and only if it participates therein.

(3) There are no two distinct Ideas such that a thing is Y if and only if it participates in the one, as well as if and only if it participates in the other.

All of these statements are extracted from various dialogues such as the Parmenides, the Gorgias, the Republic, Phaedo, Sophist, etc.


In the same manner he extracts the various classes of things that can be an Idea:

(1) Ethical and esthetical Ideas, such as the Idea of the Good, the Idea of the Just, the Idea of the Beautiful.

(2) Ideas for certain very general notions, such as the Ideas of Sameness and Difference, Being and Not-being, Likeness and Un-likeness, One and Many.

(3) Mathematical Ideas, such as the Idea of the Circle, the Idea of the diameter, the Idea of the Two, Three, etc.

(4) Ideas for the natural kinds, such as the Idea of Man, Ox, Stone, etc.

(5) Ideas for kinds of artifacts, such as the Idea of the Table and that of the Couch.




Pierre’s Plato Set of Propositions

1a. The expression Y is the name of a sudden experience, a member of the class of Idea.

1b. The sudden experience of Y may be the consequence of a special training of philosophy, or learning, that culminates in Y.

1c. The philosophers who train themselves, or are lead by another, to the experience and understanding of Y are called Platonists.


1d. The experience of Y by philosophers is known as a mystical experience.


1e. The experience of Y is not a concept but a” beholding” or experiencing Y.


2a. The experience of Y by Platonists is alone called participation in Y.


2b. There is something, an Idea, such that it is by participation therein that a thing is Y.


2c. It is by participation in the Idea of Y that Y-ness is established and is its object of knowledge.


2d. It is by participation in false beliefs of both the self and the nature of reality that there arises ignorance.


2e. The power for participation is in this case of ignorance is by persuasion within the family, clan, and society.


2f. The power necessary to move from ignorance to knowledge is through the practice and development of phronasis; which is the goal of the philosopher king’s training as noted in Plato’s Republic.


2g. The power of phronasis is to turn the mind away from its false beliefs to the experience the nature of the reality, of which the mind of man is already is a part.


2h. The object of the knowledge of Y is already present to man and does not require a search for that which he already is.


2i. The object of Y not needing to search outside of itself can be known through the recollection of what mind is, or nous..


3a. The members of the class of Y have faint copies that are experienced in the everyday world and that are named after the class members of Y.


3b. The members of Y have a relation of its faint copies as shadows to their objects, or model and copy, since there is a diminished symmetry between the copies and their natural objects; for primary terms surpass its shadows, or its analogue.


3c. In each context in which the expression Y occurs, it is the name of one of the [sic].


3d. The unity of the essential members of Y constitute a oneness not a manyness.


3d. The members of the class of Y are different ways of signifying essential aspects of Y and they can apply to either side of the symmetry, the shadow or its natural object.


3e. The essential members of the class of Y are the terms that gain a supra-dimensional reference beyond what can be experienced in everyday existence; (i) reality since nothing formerly thought real can compare with the reality of Y, (ii) truth since it is experienced as what truly IS, (iii) the perfection of beauty since nothing can be conceived as being more beautiful, (iv) eternal since neither space nor time, neither generation and decay, can be attributed to it, (v) divine since it is beatific, (vi) the dynamic or vitalistic aspect of Y is directly experienced such that no particular thing that is known has life and vital can be compared with it.


3f. The essential members of the class Y are the essential elements that are recognized as belonging to the class of intelligent beings, or those possessing mind, so that in the functioning of mind there is a discovery that mind discovers mind in the realization of Y.


3g. the class of ideas that can be derived from the experience of Y in respect to it dynamic or vital aspect are (i) sameness or same in respect to always being the same, (ii) difference or other in respect to it dynamic or vitalistic aspect, (iii) motion in respect to its vital and dynamic aspect, (iv) rest in respect to it always being the same, (v) Being since it has a mode of existence beyond what is said to exist.


4a. The class of members of Y can each be verified to belong to the same class either by the experience of Y or an accurate description of Y derived from the experience of Y.


4b. The Idea Y is an ontological term and only secondarily are they an ethical or aesthetical term for Y.


4c. The personification of the essential ideas are represented as Gods and Goddesses in the mythology of Greek mythology and are employed to dramatize key relations between essential ideas.


Please note that the correspondence of items 3, 4, and 5 have not been included. These are the mathematicals, natural items, and artifacts. I can add these to the list next weekend when I have a bit more time.

By the way, can you see that they require an understanding of analogy?